Reviews of “Abduction, reason, and science”
“What distinguishes abductive inference from other modes of inference? Whatdistinguishes the different forms of abductive inference? These are perhaps the key questions that face the student of abduction, and the core of Lorenzo Magnani’s book is devoted to them. The book contains, among other things, a defence of several putative distinctions, and it touches on an impressively wide range of perspectives, citing much of the relevant work in artificial intelligence and cognitive science.”Jon Williamson in: Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 54 (2003), 353–358 [download pdf]
A deeply constitutive intuition that is included in all systems of modal logic is that if ‘p’ then ‘possibly p.’ In other words, to show something possible one merely constructs an actual model. An equally compelling intuition is that appearance is not reality. It is in such a context and with such intent that Professor Lorenzo Magnani presents and then attempts to resolve the central puzzle of abduction. The book is both difficult and rewarding, affording a new perspective on abduction, a wealth of contextual information, and most important, exemplifies a mode of doing philosophy of science that seems a welcome departure from the traditional focus on purely conceptual arguments.Mark Weinstein in: Studies in Philosophy and Education 23: 283–292, 2004 [download pdf]
AI Magazine, Atocha Aliseda: Review of L. Magnani, Abduction, Reason and Science: Processes of Discovery and Explanation, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 2001; A Review, Spring, 2002:113-114.
Informal Logic, Marcello Guarini. Review: Magnani’s Abduction, Reason, and Science: Processes of Discovery and Explanation, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 2001; 23 (3).
Cybernetics and Systems: An International Journal: Ephraim Nissan, Facets of Abductive Reasoning. Review of L. Magnani, Abduction, Reason and Science: Processes of Discovery and Explanation, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 2001, 34:381-399, 2003.
Reviews of Philosophy and geometry: theoretical and historical issues
“Magnani explains the link between ‘‘construction’’ in Kant’s sense and his famous ‘‘schematism’’, as well as that between both and the ‘‘axioms of intuition’’. This is a notoriously unrewarding task and Magnani does not, in my view, fare much better than the best among his predecessors. To carry clarification any further one must perhaps give too loose a rein to one’s fantasy, and we must certainly be grateful to Magnani for not doing so”R. Torretti in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (2003), 151–160 [download pdf]
“The goal of Magnani’s project is bold. In broad strokes, he sweeps over the history of geometry with a Kantian brush, and though the approach is provocative, we are left with a question of what role history plays in Magnani’s work, or more specifically, what sort of interplay he allows between the history and the philosophy of geometry. Magnani does not allow history to point us to a particular philosophy.”M. Domsky in: Philosophy of Science, 71 (July 2004) pp. 412–424 [download pdf]
Philosophical Inquiry, 25 (3-4):262-266. Stavros Kiriakakis, Review of Lorenzo Magnani, Philosophy and Geometry, Theoretical and Historical Issues. Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2001.
Mathesis, ; 3(1):403-404, 2006. Elena Anne Marchisotto: Review of Lorenzo Magnani. Philosophy and Geometry, Theoretical and Historical Issues, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 2001.